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Abstract: 
 
The purpose of this paper is to look for bubbles in the Art Market using a structure based on steady state 
results for TAR models and appropriate definitions of bubbles recently put forward by Knight, Satchell and 
Srivastava (2011). The usual method for investigating bubbles is to measure prices as deviations from fair 
value. We assess whether it is meaningful to define a fair value of art and conclude that it is very 
challenging empirically to implement any definition. We then treat fair value as zero in one instance and 
unobservable in the other case and in both cases provide evidence of bubbles in the art market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Bubbles, Asset prices, Steady state, Non-linear time series, TAR models, Art 
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1. Introduction  
 
Art pieces not only hold value for the beholder, but are fast becoming a sound investment 
option. World wide, the size of the art market was reported to be around 40 billion dollars 
in 2008. And it has been growing fast. The European Fine Art Foundation (TEFAF) 
reported2 that size was estimated at 30 billion dollars in 2001. Christie’s and Sotheby’s 
reported collective sales of around 12 billion in 2007. And this is only auction sales. 
There is a big private market, dealer market and gallery sales, of which only estimates are 
available as the information regarding transactions and prices is quite limited. Thus there 
are resultant asymmetries of information regarding the price and quality of art. Sellers’ 
may be willing to reveal the true value of the painting to the buyer. Mc Andrew’s report 
for TEFAF reports that the art dealer sales in 2006 reached a record $28.6 billion, 
accounting for slightly more than half of the estimated 54.9 billion dollars global total. In 
2006 about 1 million transactions involving dealers took place globally3. It is also 
reported that in 2007 the private art market was worth approximately 30 billion dollars4. 
Investment in art is fast becoming a mainstream asset class as the universe of collectors 
has grown enormously and the vast amounts of wealth that have been accumulated. Large 
gains can be realised by matching prospective wealthy buyers or collectors and 
specialised works of established artists. The number of funds dealing with art investments 
is growing indicative of this development.  
 
Given the state of the art market, it seems possible that prices and the rather nebulous 
concept of true value may not be perfectly aligned at all times. Our paper explores 
potential discrepancies between the two. These discrepancies are often described as 
bubbles.  Our goal in this paper is to introduce and investigate a model of art prices 
focusing on the creation of bubbles. The process we use, due to Blanchard (1979, 1982) 
                                                 
2 As reported in Artnewletter, May 2008 
3 Report is in a series of major studies commissioned by TEFAF that act as a focus for the launch of their 
annual Maastricht fair  
4 Artnewletter, May 2008 
 3
is a threshold autoregressive model with different regimes and we define the presence of 
bubbles as corresponding to non-stationary behavior in the deviation from fair value in at 
least one regime. More recent formal justification for such a structure comes from an 
agent based model by Ahn, Sandford and Sheax (2011) who derive an equilibrium 
between rational agents who regard art as worthless and uninformed investors who 
attribute value to it (albeit erroneously). This leads to a two state model where switching 
is endogenous. Another justification for a two state world with explosive and stationary 
states for prices or deviations of prices from value is presented in Abel (1988) who finds 
multiple equilibria in his asset pricing model which can be stationary or explosive. Kurz 
and Motolese (2010) use heterogeneity in beliefs to motivate simple autoregressive 
structures that may be stationary or explosive. They are careful to use the word 
‘illustrative’ to describe the simple version of their model. We regard our model as 
‘illustrative’ in the same sense.  
 
Defining or quantifying the value of art is a rather difficult exercise. Baumol (1986) has 
famously described the investment in art as a ‘crap game’ explaining in economic terms 
why the value of art is hard to define. Section 2 discusses the art market and how it is 
organised. There are different hierarchies in the art market consisting of the primary 
market, the secondary market and at the top is the international market. Most calculations 
or analysis ignore the dealer market, mainly because of lack of data and this section also 
touches upon how that could affect price measurement and certain other difficulties 
which arise due to the nature of art markets. Section 3 contains the discussion on the 
value of art, there is both an economic and a cultural value associated with art work and 
how that two could be related, which makes any sort of valuation very complicated. 
Despite this, there an increasing belief in the value of art as a sound investment option 
which this section assesses. It reviews the literature on other features such as galleries’ 
and artists’ reputations, role of consumption capital, hedonic factors that influence the 
value of art. Section 4 explains the art market index used in our estimation. Following the 
discussion from previous sections about the value of art, it also points out problems with 
the data and factors that can cause potential biases.  The empirical application of fitting a 
generalized Blanchard model (Knight, Satchell and Srivastava (2011)) using art data is 
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presented in section 5. We have treated the fair value of art as being zero in section 5 and 
then, in section 6, we explore the implications of the value of art being stochastic, namely 
AR (1) but unobservable. We present a model for the fair value of art using the above. 
This leads to two calculations, the first is when we take it into account and the second is 
when we ignore it and compute the biases involved in running ordinary least squares 
(OLS) (omitted variables).   
 
2. The Art Market 
 
The art market is characterised by a hierarchy of submarkets according to the analysis in 
Gerard-Varet (1995). The first stage consists of a primary market of individual artists 
who supply to galleries, exhibitions or to customers directly. This is where artists’ work 
gets recognised. This signals their ability to the secondary (dealer) market which consists 
of galleries, dealers or art museums. It is here that the market is more concentrated both 
on the buyer and seller side. On the seller side, this is because very few artists can make a 
successful transition from primary to secondary markets and establish themselves. This is 
exacerbated by the fact that works of famous dead artists who are still very reputable also 
circulate in this market. On the buyer side, it consists of mostly private or public 
collectors. Schonfeld and Reinstaller (2007) discuss that this interaction between these 
two economic agents, the sellers (art galleries mainly) and the buyers, determines the 
nature of competition and framework of exchange in the primary art market.  
 
At the top of hierarchy is the international market consisting of mainly the big auction 
houses in cities like London, New York, Paris who are the major players and handle most 
of the sales. Here the buyers include individual wealthy collectors, museums, and private 
foundations. An essential feature of the market is informational asymmetry as the sellers 
make profits by exploiting information on the willingness of buyers to pay for specific art 
works.  
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However, an issue with any discussion regarding the classification of art markets is that 
the dealer market and transactions in this market are very often ignored. This is largely 
because of the lack of availability of data to estimate what share of the market is 
composed of dealers. Campell (2008) discusses the impact of this on valuation of art 
market and the rate of return reflected by the indices. Anderson (1974) estimated that 
dealers sale prices are about 20-50 per cent higher than the price at which they obtain the 
stock, which is mainly from auctions. This reduces the rate of return for investors as 
dealers at a higher price than the auction which reflects high transaction costs too.  
Campbell (2008) points out that there is a high probability that art funds who also act 
more like private dealers than auction houses, adopt a very similar strategy to take 
advantage of the inefficiencies in the market through their insider knowledge and 
expertise. These features are likely to produce art market returns which could be greater 
than the benchmarks used in this analysis.   
 
Another aspect of art markets is the nature of the markets itself. The goods ‘produced’ in 
art markets are each unique, hence inherently heterogeneous. Each seller is a monopolist 
of a particular painting and each artist is like a monopsonist. The other issue is that sales 
are not continuous and objects may not get resold very frequently. Mei and Moses (2002) 
discuss both these aspects as major difficulties with respect to art markets. 
 
3. Value in Art 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, value of art is not just determined by its aesthetic 
value but there is also an intrinsic economic value attached to art works as they become 
an investment option. We argue in this section, looking at the literature on this debate, 
that indeed, different characteristics of art works have a definitive affect on the economic 
value and the transactions in the market are not just ‘symbolic interchanges’.   
 
The main contention with determining the value of art is that it is associated with both an 
economic value or financial or commercial value and a cultural or aesthetic value in order 
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to capture the distinction in when measured in a standard economic model as compared to 
in cultural terms (including characteristics like status symbol, aesthetic properties, 
symbolic, spiritual or historical significance, uniqueness, influence on artistic trends 
amongst others). There are various issues that must be considered while doing any 
economic analysis o art objects and markets.  
 
Throsby (2003) contends that the cultural value of art may sometimes render the 
economic value irrelevant. He argues that there is a dual market to which artists’ supply; 
a physical market which determines its economic price, and a market for ideas, which 
determines its cultural price. Transactions in this market can be deemed as economic 
according to him, in so far as ‘when a cultural good is made available to the public, 
consumers absorb, interpret and evaluate the ideas contained in the work, discussing and 
exchanging their assessments with others’. If a consensus is reached, then this assessed 
value can be thought of as an exchange value reached by negotiation amongst parties to a 
market transaction, where the ‘market’ is that for the cultural content of the work. 
Another important point he notes is the pure public good properties of art. When art work 
is available for the public to view in museums or public spaces, there are positive 
externalities and it becomes a part of ‘cultural heritage’. Frey and Pommerehne (1989) 
also recognise the ‘psychic returns’ from the enjoyment of viewing and looking at art 
work.   
Values in both markets may not be independent of each other as attributes that determine 
both might be very similar, but keep changing with reassessments of the work’s 
economic and cultural worth. Velthuis (2005) believes that there is an association 
between the aesthetic judgment of museum experts and the commercial assessment of 
markets and argues that prices both create and reflect value. . Economic value is often 
also driven by lifestyle choices and cultural norms and that in turn, cultural and social 
customs reflect economic interests as Valsan (2006) argues. There is an increasing strand 
of literature that is focused on how to integrate the two values (Koerner and Koerner 
(1996), Benedikt (1997)). 
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Of course any valuation is complicated by the existence of different conditioning factors 
that influence the process. To the extent that price of an art work may rise over time, it 
has an investment asset characteristic to it and can be considered as a store of value. 
Many studies in literature like Anderson (1974), Stein (1977), Baumol (1986) have 
contributed to examine the rates of return on paintings.  
 
Velthuis (2005) examines the relationship between art prices and artwork size, which 
according to him, provides a stable way of pricing. He also notes that a reason for price 
dispersion in art markets is the allocation mechanisms along with transaction and search 
costs. In auction circuits, it is a market mechanism whereas administrative pricing is 
preferred in primary markets. More recently, auction data is generally relied upon for 
econometric studies.  
 
Valsan (2006) draws a comparison between value of art and that of financial assets. A 
very simple interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is that prices are not 
different from their value which is determined by what investors agree upon. In a similar 
vein, he compares that prices not only measure the value of art but also define our 
concept of what art value is. He says, ‘more symbolic the asset in question, the more 
apparent it is that economic values are contingent on what we culturally accept as 
legitimate determinants of value’.  
 
Frey (1997) discusses the nature of art as an investment and details the literature under 
three categories of studies that compare art investment with other traditional investment 
options (like bonds, stocks, real estate), studies that evaluate art auctions and studies on 
objects and all forms of collectibles. Singer and Lynch (1997) examine whether it pays to 
buy art from a financial perspective. They note that wealthy collectors of the highest 
quality of art benefit the most as they can take advantage of the informational asymmetry 
in the market. That  there  may  be  connections  between  art  and  wealth  is  not  really  
a  surprise. Certainly, one of the constraints limiting the price of art works in the wealth 
of agents willing to purchase them.  As compared to them, buyers of lower quality art 
face a much higher (monetary) opportunity cost. Thus for high quality buyers, yields are 
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as high as would be in any other financial market. Frey and Eichenberger (1995) also 
note how high quality art is always a sound investment option from a financial point of 
view and that such buyers are even charged lower commissions and transaction costs by 
auction houses and thus earn a higher return in the market.  
 
Reputation, interactions between galleries and interaction between galleries and artists 
Here,  the  ‘commercial reputation’  of  galleries  and  dealers  is  mixed  with  the  
‘aesthetic  reputation’  of artistic  works.  Given the high degree of uncertainty about the 
quality of art work, reputation of both galleries and their artists become important proxies 
or even determinants of value and quality (Adler (1985), Shubik (2003)). By signaling 
the gallery’s competence in choosing high potential artists, reputations are an important 
indicator and outcome of a functioning primary market. This feature helps alleviate 
intrinsic risk of buying low quality work. Featuring an art piece in the gallery is a signal 
of quality to potential customers decreasing the asymmetry of art specific knowledge. 
Thus, in many ways the reputation of the gallery and artist are intertwined. By organizing 
exhibitions, shows, reviewing artist’s work through experts they direct attention of public 
and important collectors whose purchase supports the quality judgment of the gallery 
(Velthuis (2005)). This helps galleries establish a long term relationship with artists and 
customers, and not only boost artists’ reputation, but also raise prices. These are 
important parameters that the gallery can influence through its own efforts.  
 
Value of art is also dependent on the consumption capital of customers or collectors who 
are able to ascertain the inherent value associated with a piece of art work. This also 
depends on their consumption capital that they have acquired. Thus, just as sellers can be 
classified according to their reputation and the reputation of their featured artists, buyers 
can be categorized accordingly to their knowledge. This is explained in Stigler and 
Becker (1977) who elaborate on how people’s tastes and preferences, and hence the 
utility they derive from consuming art are different according to various factors like the 
social environment they grow up in, education amongst others. Thus the more 
consumption capital they have, the more knowledgeable they are, the higher the pay offs 
they derive from consuming art. This also generates a kind of specificity in their 
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consumption, in that they are more likely to buy more from a group of particular artists. 
As a result of this ‘path dependent’ nature of consumption capital, buyers incur switching 
costs if they change between different kinds of arts or artists.  
 
Bonus and Ronte (1997) study evidence of how galleries interact and react to each other 
which gets reflected in their pricing decisions. Schonfeld and Reinstaller (2007) explain 
that under the presence of switching costs, as they also lower the risk of losing market 
share, galleries can charge prices slightly above the ‘competitive level’. On the other 
hand, by lowering prices to subsidise switching costs of customers with a different 
consumption capital, they can gain market share. Thus, prices are an effective tool used 
by galleries to increase profits or increase market share. The cost of the resultant 
uncertainty is borne by buyers and they thus have to rely on signals like reputation.  
 
 
4. Art Data 
 
Due to the growing art market, there have been many attempts to create art price indices 
to help compare art with other investment options. Campbell (2008) notes that there are 
four main methodologies used for producing art price indices which include geometric 
means, average prices, repeat sales, and hedonic regressions which are closely related 
over long periods (Chanel, Gerard-Varet and Ginsburgh (1990)). Candola and Scorcu 
(1997) warn of the potential of misleading evaluation with indexes as they involve 
narrow data set and might reflect experts’ opinions, heterogeneity and therefore difficulty 
in aggregation.  
 
Biases arise from use of both repeat sales and average prices in a highly heterogeneous 
market. Repeat sales regressions require artworks to be offered for sale at auction more 
than once to be included as a repeat sale. These biases in repeat sales are also quite well 
known in the literature on house prices (Case, Pollakowski and Wachter (1991,1997), 
Gatzlaff and Haurin (1997)). An important problem with repeat sales regressions is the 
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possibility of sample selection bias. The problem is that some types of art or paintings 
may trade more frequently on the market than other types so that they will be over-
represented in the repeat sales sample. When these types of paintings exhibit different 
price changes, then the repeat sales index tends to be biased. For example, if low quality 
paintings sell more frequently than high quality ones but high quality ones rise in price at 
a slower rate, a repeat sales index will tend to have an upward bias.  
 
Another aspect of this is the holding duration of these assets which can be quite unevenly 
distributed due to differences in prices and transaction costs. Zanola (2007) address the 
potential problem of sample selection bias by applying the Heckman two-stage 
procedure. The probit model predicts the probability of whether the object is sold only 
once or is a repeat sales object. These estimates are then used to construct an inverse 
Mills ratio which is used in the repeat sales regression as an explanatory variable. This is 
done to obtain consistent estimates and test for sample selection bias by using data on 
single and repeat sales to construct the price index rather than restricting it to the 
transactions which actually occur twice.  
 
Models that combine information on repeat sales with hedonic approach are the new 
direction in construction of indices. Characteristics like reputation of the artist, artistic 
merit of the particular work like degree of conformity with the artist’s style, period over 
which it was painted, history of ownership, play an important role in realized prices. 
Condition, subject matter and size also affect and to some extent determine ownership of 
the work. However, this methodology fails to directly solve the sample selection 
problem. In particular, in the case of repeat sales model a double selection problem 
emerges (Zanola (2007)). The sample size is quite small as the repeat sales are infrequent 
and cannot represent the population. As second sales are omitted from the first sale data, 
it can create selection biases in the sample.  
 
Here we use data from the Art100 Index from Art Market Research (AMR). The data is 
monthly available from 1970 onwards.  
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5. Estimation 
 
Using data from the Art 100 Index, we estimate results for the framework outlined in 
Knight and Satchell (2011) which we call the generalized Blanchard model (Knight et 
al(2011)). These require the use of an exogenous switching variable. We present a brief 
analysis based on this structure. 
 
Let  be the price and be the fundamentals. tp *p
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where =0 with probability 1−tI π-1  and =1 with probability 1−tI π . 
In the Blanchard model, παβ 1=  where 
r+= 1
1α  where r is the constant rate of return 
on the riskless asset. This particular value of β  corresponds to the bubble as defined very 
precisely in Blanchard (1979). Following Knight et al (2011), we call (1) the generalized 
Blanchard model. In this case, our interpretation changes slightly; essentially we are 
proposing a system of possibly explosive dynamics for deviations from fair value. 
Theorem 2 discusses the case of the Blanchard model, and it is noted that the steady state 
distribution always exist; if παβ 1= , the mean does not exist and hence the variance 
does not exist. If παβ 1≠ , that is the general case, then the mean exists if  1<πβ  and 
is equal to  and the variance exists if . *p 10 <π2< β
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 VIX and University of Michigan Sentiment Index are used to generate an exogenous 
threshold. For the results following Knight and Satchell (2011) in table 1, we see that in 
the case of VIX, the threshold value above which prices are in a high regime is 29.97. It 
corresponds to periods of market panic and captures the bubbles as the coefficient is 
greater than 1 in the high regime (which is likely to occur 5 per cent of the time). 
Similarly, the results for the consumer sentiment index in table 2 indicate that when the 
sentiment is low, there is turmoil in the market. The threshold level for the sentiment 
index is around 83.7 and we do observe that in the high regime, the coefficient is greater 
than 1 (which occurs with a probability of 30 per cent).  
 
Insert table 1, 2, 3, 4 here 
 
The results are equally encouraging for the generalised Blanchard model where we 
impose that the coefficient in the low regime is zero. The results do indicate the presence 
of bubbles in art market data as the coefficient of interest, β  is greater than 1 in the 
volatile regime as shown in table 3 and table 4.  
 
The results above show the values of β  for the three indices based on the average price 
of all sales, the average of the top 10 percent and the average price of the top 2 per cent. 
We also report the proportion of data points in the bubble regime. In all six cases, we 
have value of β  greater than 1. In all cases, the steady state means and variances exist. It 
should be noted that high levels of volatility lead to art market bubbles whilst low levels 
of sentiment lead to art market bubbles. The interpretation of art as a ‘safe haven’ asset is 
complicated by the fact that prices are rising explosively in the bubble regime 60 per cent 
of the time but 40 per cent of the time they are also falling explosively.  
 
We do not provide a rigorous interpretation of the t statistics or test for significance as it 
becomes very complicated owing to the difficulty in defining the problem. For instance, 
our null hypothesis of the existence of a bubble would be  
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6. Modeling the Fair Value of Art 
 
In a previous paper, we treated the value of art as being 0 (Knight et al. (2011)). In this 
section, we explore the implications of the value of art being autoregressive (AR (1)) but 
unobservable. This leads to two calculations, the first is when we take it into account and 
the second is when we ignore it and compute the biases involved in running OLS 
(omitted variables). Initially, we shall justify the AR(1) assumption for fair value.  
 
Using a dividend discount model or net present value argument, we can broadly say that 
RPrD
d
c
D
cp
f +=
≈+≈ 1  
where is the risk free rate and fr RP is the risk premium.  
 
We are interested in whether prices can be stationary or not. Assuming prices follow a 
random walk is tantamount to saying that a steady state probability distribution of prices 
does not exist. In the context of cointegration, if c was I(1) and d was I(1) and they were 
cointegrated or both were I(0), then we would have a stationary outcome. Poterba and 
Summers (1988) note that to get sufficient power to discriminate between whether the 
price series of equity are stationary or cointegrated, a very long time series is required. It 
is clear that with conventional data sets, being able to say with certainty, that prices are 
I(1) or I(0) seems difficult. 
 
Evidence on dividends being I(0) is vast. Bansal and Lundblad (2002) assume that the 
risk free rate and the time varying price of risk are both stationary, hence d is stationary. 
They do also assume that the cash flow is I(1). Gurkaynak (2005) takes the order of the 
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AR process that governs dividends to be 1 for simplicity and assumes that dividends are 
exogenous and follow a stationary AR(1) process. Fukuta (2002) also works under the 
assumption that D is time-varying but stationary. Goyal and Welch (2002) also find that 
dividends have remained stationary over time. Perron (1988) also notes that the real 
dividend and earning series are stationary around a linear deterministic trend. Kleidon 
(1986) show  that  nominal  aggregate  dividends and  earnings  are  non stationary  with  
a  unit  root.  However, real  dividend and  real  earnings are  stationary  around  a  
significant  linear  trend when  the  deflator  used  is  the  producer  price  index.  
 
Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) assume the price-dividend ratio and risky asset risk 
premium are stationary. Engel, Wang and Wu (2010) look at present value asset pricing 
models to find existence of unobservable stationary fundamentals which could be a result 
of risk premium. Nilsson and Hansson (2004) note that earlier empirical applications of 
CAPM (Sharpe (1964)) that assumed an unconditional model, risk premium as well as 
asset “betas” were taken as stationary over a fixed period. Risk  premia  in  the  term  
structure literature are  typically  treated  as  stationary  variables  both  in  the theoretical 
(Backus, Gregory and Telmer (1989)) and  empirical  investigations. Empirically, Meese 
and Singleton (1982) and Bollerslev and Baillie (1988, 1994) find that the forward 
premium is stationary (by finding the forward and spot exchange rates to be cointegrated 
with zero intercept and slope coefficient close to 1). Karlsson and Schoultz (2003) find a 
risk premium significantly parted from zero that is stationary and time varying. Corbae, 
Lim and Ouliaris (1992) also note that conventionally risk premium is assumed to be 
stationary. Additionally, they show that when forward exchange rates are unbiased 
predictors of future spot rates, the risk premium is stationary. Carriero (2006) finds 
evidence of a stationary but time varying risk premium between the UK and the US when 
testing uncovered interest rate parity. A similar result is obtained in Byrne and Nagayasu 
(2008) who present evidence of a stationary risk premium for certain emerging European 
economies. Concluding, our assumption of a stationary AR(1) model for fair value is 
reasonable and consistent with a large literature. We could extend it to a more general 
ARMA structure but only at the cost of much greater complexity. 
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We now present an analysis of the time series properties of deviations from fair value in 
the generalised Blanchard model.  
Let  be our fundamental and  be the price. Using the structure of (1), we can write 
our model as: 
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Solving for (3), we see that  
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We can identify this as an ARMA(2,1). In regime 2, this is an ARMA(1,1). Whilst it may 
be possible to estimate some of the parameters via methods of moments, it is not at all 
clear that we can identify all the parameters in the model. We present some further 
calculations in Appendix 1.  
 
We now show that the assumption of fair value of 0 when in fact it follows an AR(1) 
leads to an downward bias in our estimation of β . Thus our empirical estimates of β  are 
likely to be less than the true value. 
 
Proposition 1.  Assuming the structure given by equation (4), and 011 >−>− φβπ  , 
and stationary fundamentals, it follows that plim βˆ β< . If 0=γ , we only require that 
0>−φβ .  
 
Proof: 
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We first look at the covariance between the right-hand side variable and the error term in 
(4).  
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Thus, it holds if 0≠γ ,  βφ > , 0)()1( >−+− βφππ  or  ))(1(1 φβπ −+> or 
011 >−>− φβπ . 
 
If 0=γ , then the following holds. 
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This shows that the estimates are downward biased. The assumption that β  is greater 
than φ  assumes that expected relative price of art in the up state is larger than the overall 
AR(1) coefficient in the fundamentals equation and does not seem implausible at all. In 
effect, if fair value in art is a stationary random variable and the true value of β  is 
greater than 1, we are assured that the estimated value will be less than the true value. So 
an estimated value greater than 1 forβ and assumed value of φ  less than 1 lend support 
to the presence of a bubble. We need to also note that π , the steady state probability of a 
bubble varies between 5 per cent and 30 per cent and so it seems quite plausible that 
proposition 1 holds in the art markets investigated if they have the structure which we 
assumed.  
  
7. Conclusion 
 
We have investigated whether there are bubbles in the art market over approximately the 
last thirty years. Using several measures of sentiment as trigger variables, we have found 
evidence of bubbles over both longer and shorter periods depending upon our choice of 
indicator. In common with many other researchers, we have struggled to define a fair 
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value of art. Our contribution however is to show that under plausible assumptions, 
ignoring the fair value of art but only assuming that it is a stationary AR(1) still allows 
one to investigate the presence of bubbles in a meaningful way. Our results support the 
presence of bubbles in the overall category as measured by the Art Market Research 
Index. We note a number of caveats. Firstly, given our definition of bubbles, testing for a 
bubble is a formidable analytical challenge. Secondly, the index data in common with 
other data that we considered does not include the dealer market. And this market may 
have a more rational pricing structure. Thirdly, we have deliberately finessed one of the 
deep issues of our culture by either not defining the value of art or defining it to follow a 
simple statistical process. Fourthly, our model is extremely simplistic involving only 
autoregressive and threshold relationships of order 1. This is not because we believe them 
to be true, but we need to able to carry out some analysis by proving that the bias in our 
estimation techniques can be signed. Even in our simple case, our price distribution 
switches between an ARMA(2,1) and an ARMA(1,1). Such switching processes have 
complicated moments and in our context at least, unidentifiable parameters. It was 
Baumol (1986) who told us how difficult it was to compute value for art; we have tried to 
extend his analysis by demonstrating how one can still detect bubbles even without 
observing value.  
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 Appendix 1 
 
Statistical properties of the price process 
 
We examine the error term in regime 1 
where 
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Results of Threshold Autoregression from Knight and Satchell (2011) 
 
Table 1 PARAMETER ESTIMATES USING VIX AS THRESHOLD (MONTHLY, 1990-2008) 
 
 ALL TOP 10 TOP 2 
ALPHA1 1511.307 -293.2741 2923.354 
BETA1 0.824783 1.039243 0.803158 
ALPHA2 -195.2729 -396.7130 -356.3024 
BETA2 -195.2729 -396.7130 -356.3024 
Bubble 
Percentile 
     
95(=29.97) 
 
30(=14.31)
 
95 
 
Table 2 PARAMETER ESTIMATES USING MICHIGAN SENTIMENT INDEX AS THRESHOLD 
(MONTHLY, 1978-2008) 
 
 ALL TOP 10 TOP 2 
ALPHA1 1.023126 1.027249 1.020404 
BETA1 0.997189 0.963807 0.961486 
ALPHA2 -53.13096 -90.50360 -74.90481 
BETA2 -32.38653 42.52673 33.91365 
Bubble 
Percentile  31(=83.2) 11(=69.28) 
 
11 
 
Results of Generalised Blanchard Model from Knight,Satchell and Srivastava (2011) 
 
Table 3 PARAMETER ESTIMATES USING VIX AS THRESHOLD (MONTHLY, 1990-2008) 
 
 ALL TOP 10 TOP 2 
ALPHA1 1.008824 1.013771 1.011954 
Bubble 
Percentile 95 95 95 
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Table 4 PARAMETER ESTIMATES USING MICHIGAN SENTIMENT INDEX AS THRESHOLD 
(MONTHLY, 1978-2008) 
 
ART 100 ALL TOP 10 TOP 2 
ALPHA1 1.010368 1.014954 1.013350 
Bubble 
Percentile 95 95 95 
 
